WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. $22. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. ThoughtCo. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. Congress supported the resolution with Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. 426-436. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. And who is going to believe that? The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. The intelligence community, including its SIGINT component, responded with a regional buildup to support the increase in U.S. operational forces. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang, racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters.2 About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. 10. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. This article by Capt. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. Here's why he couldn't walk away. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. 313-314. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox.
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